NEW BANK ATTACKS
In mid-May 2018, the Expert Security Center (ESC) at Positive Technologies detected a phishing campaign directed at the financial sector. A number of signs suggest that the Cobalt group or its past participants continue to operate.
Messages were sent from the domain swift-sipn[.]info (85.143.166[.]158). The structure of the domain is identical to the domains previously used by the Cobalt group throughout its attacks on banks in Russia and Eastern Europe.1
The message contains a link (swift-fraud[.]com (85.143.166[.]99) to download a malicious document (d117c73e353193118a6383c30e42a95f). The same delivery technique was used by Cobalt in 2018. The document contains three exploits for remote code execution in Microsoft Word: CVE-2017-8570, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2018-0802. Analysis of the document structure suggests similarity to documents generated with the Threadkit exploit kit. This is the same exploit kit used by Cobalt starting in February 2018.
Besides the exploits, the document contains four embedded OLE objects: a nextstage BAT script (4bee6ff39103ffe31118260f9b1c4884), scriptlet for CVE-2017-8570 (bb784d55895db10b67b1b4f1f5b0be16), dummy document (c2a9443aac258a60d8cace43e839cf9f), and configuration file for cmstp.exe (581c2a76b382deedb48d1df077e5bdf1). All these objects are located in the %TEMP% folder of the user who opened the document. These objects are created in %TEMP% via the Package ActiveX Control. The objects have the following format:
After any of the exploits is triggered, the next-stage BAT script runs:
Interestingly, this script leads to launching the utility cmstp.exe, which then downloads COM-DLL-Dropper (f0e52df398b938bf82d9e71ce754ab34) from cloud.yourdocument[.]biz (31.148.219[.]177).
Use of this standard Windows utility allows bypassing AppLocker, as well as downloading and running SCT or COM objects using the standard Windows utility regsvr32.exe. This method of bypassing AppLocker was discovered and described publicly this year.
cmstp.exe uses a configuration file that is also an OLE object in the original malicious document:
First, two random values are generated and stored in the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\ Software\Microsoft\Notepad\[username]:
After these values are generated, persistence is ensured via a logon script.
- Reconnaissance via WMI
- Launch of programs via CMD
- Launch of new modules via regsvr32.exe
- Detection of antivirus software
- Encryption of traffic with RC4
A new backdoor function checks for the backdoor in %APPDATA% based on the registry key indicated above. If no registry key is present or the backdoor is not found in %APPDATA%, it will not run.
Cybercriminals increasingly use social engineering to penetrate infrastructures in targeted attacks. Time and again, incident investigation and security testing by Positive Technologies underline that the human factor is the weak point in security: statistics show that in 27 percent of cases, recipients click links in phishing messages. Attackers are often able to draw employees into correspondence (and even security staff, in 3 percent of cases). And if a message is sent from the address of a real company (a technique used by Cobalt), attackers’ success rate jumps to 33 percent.
Therefore security awareness training for employees is more important than ever. Key recommendations for companies include:
- Regular awareness-building among employees
- Timely installation of security updates (both applications and operating systems)
- Use of capable protection solutions, including malware detection systems that allow employees to self-scan attachments and other files as needed
- Full investigation of all security incidents
1 In March 2018, the accused ringleader of the Cobalt group was arrested in Europe.Download PDF